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Scholars and policy makers alike have long recognized the
importance of secure land tenure for sustainable land manage-
ment, productivity-enhancing investment, operation of land mar-
kets that transfer land to its best and most productive use, and
eventually of access to credit markets by using land as a collateral
(Besley and Ghatak, 2010). Yet, while this has given rise to an array
of interventions to formalize land rights in virtually all of the
world’s regions, Africa remains in many ways an exception. A key
reason is that in Africa, customary institutions traditionally
provided levels of tenure security high enough to encourage
investment (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994). Given the continent’s
traditional features including relative land abundance and produc-
ers’ use of rather simple un-mechanized technology with reliance
on family labor, it is generally believed there is little scope for large
investment that would require access to credit. This would imply
limited scope for productivity differences across producers and
consequently for land (rental) markets to improve productivity.
Together with the high cost of formalization efforts, this has led
to a widely held view that, in the African context, efforts to
increase tenure security will be superfluous (Pinckney and
Kimuyu, 1994), not sustainable (Atwood, 1990) or may, if they give
rise to appropriation of land by well-connected individuals, even
be harmful (Easterly, 2008).Recently, studies started documenting that reality may diverge
from this view in a number of respects. First, even without
accounting for the recent demand for land acquisition by large
farms in Africa (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011), productivity among
smallholders may vary considerably even in non-mechanized set-
tings (Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis, 2015). Second, customary
systems may be biased against women, in particular restricting
their ability to inherit land and thus their bargaining power within
the household. Also, as land becomes more scarce, traditional insti-
tutions may come under stress and be no longer able to ensure
equitable land access. This is linked to increasing numbers of land
disputes and possibly traditional chiefs transferring land for pri-
vate gain rather than community benefit. Third, growth of the rural
non-farm economy, rural-urban migration, and diversification of
income sources increase the scope for efficiency-enhancing
transactions as dispersion of skill increases, investment becomes
more profitable, and land from those joining the non-agricultural
can be leased to those specializing in agriculture. In such
situations, rental markets can provide advantages by equalizing
factor endowments and allowing gains from specialization
(Holden et al., 2008; Jin and Jayne, 2013). If, as in commonly found,
factor markets are imperfect (Dillon and Barrett, 2016) but produc-
tion is labor- intensive with an inverse relationship between farm
size and productivity, this will increase productivity. All of this
implies that, in countries undergoing rapid economic change, reg-
ular and reliable data will be important to inform policy not only to
indicate if reality still corresponds to common wisdom but also
improve understanding of drivers and potential obstacles to struc-
tural transformation and growth of the rural non-farm economy./dx.doi.
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from 6 countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Uganda) collected under the auspices of the LSMS-ISA program
between 2010 and 2012.1 In addition to providing updated and con-
sistent information on differences across households in terms of
endowments and productivity, we assess the extent to which rental
markets help bring about the advantages expected from them. Vari-
ables available from the surveys, together with general information
on the institutional environment prevalent in these countries, are
used to identify determinants of landmarket functioning at a descrip-
tive level. We estimate a reduced formmodel of land rental and sales
market participation that makes use of the geo-referenced nature of
the data at hand. In addition to affirming the scope for sizeable gains
in equity and potentially efficiency from better functioning of land
rental markets, we go beyond the existing literature, and we formu-
late: (i) hypotheses regarding obstacles to land market functioning
that warrant discussion with policy makers and should be subjected
to further empirical tests, and (ii) we suggest variables to include in
future surveys that could inform such debates.
Main findings are as follows. First, we show that, contrary to
expectations about limited potential of land rental, in the countries
studied here, large differences in land endowments and productiv-
ity create potential for land market to equalize endowments and
contribute to higher levels of productivity. Second, we find that
land rental markets improve equity by promoting land access to
those with limited land endowments. Finally, while a detailed
examination of the impact of institutional factors is beyond the
scope of this paper, our findings suggest that rental market perfor-
mance seems lower where land rental is explicitly or implicitly
outlawed, the threat of uncompensated expropriation increases
tenure insecurity, and policies to document existing land rights,
especially by women, are not implemented or out of reach for
the majority of land holders. In addition to suggesting that there
may be a need to revise traditionally held views on African agricul-
ture and land markets, or at least to differentiate them in line with
rapid changes of land scarcity, this also implies that greater atten-
tion to these issues in the policy and institutional dialogues and in
future data collection efforts will be warranted.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses con-
ceptual background and literature regarding the role of land mar-
kets, their evolution over time, institutional pre-conditions for
effective functioning, and welfare- and productivity impacts as
well as institutional arrangements in study countries. Section three
uses LSMS-ISA data to descriptively explore levels of documenta-
tion and productivity, as well as incidence and determinants of
land rental market operation in the six countries. Section four
explores determinants of participation in land rental and sales
markets econometrically. Section five summarizes results and ini-
tial policy recommendations.22. Background and justification
To contextualize issues, this section reviews the conceptual
background and literature and the way in which they link to the
context encountered in each of the study countries. Based on the
notion that secure rights are required to provide the basis for their
operation, land rental markets have been shown to be efficiency-
and welfare enhancing all over the globe. While their potential in
Africa is often assumed to be more limited, recent studies point
towards high levels of variation across countries and show that this
picture may be changing slowly in response to secular trends. Yet,
a number of factors including a perceived threat of expropriation,1 Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture
implemented by the World Bank www.worldbank.org/lsms-isa.
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to the land they use, partial or ad-hoc implementation of certifica-
tion program, or restrictions on transferability imposed to main-
tain rural equality or stem urban migration may in practice pose
obstacles to their operation.
2.1. Conceptual framework
While Africa has traditionally been described as land abundant,
the continent is characterized by enormous heterogeneity,2 much
of the land that could potentially be available for expansion is con-
centrated in few countries (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012), often with
poor fertility or infrastructure access (Chamberlin et al., 2014).
Technology-induced limits on farmers’ ability to expand cultivated
area and demand for African land from outsiders (Arezki et al.,
2013; Schoneveld, 2014) imply that in many settings farm house-
holds have to adjust to higher levels of land scarcity, via investment
and intensification of production or greater reliance on off-farm
income, possibly alongside greater land rental market participation
(Headey and Jayne, 2014). Continued high levels of population
growth also point towards increasing land scarcity, as documented
in Mali (Guirkinger and Platteau, 2014) or Ethiopia (Headey et al.,
2014). All these factors suggest that economic development and
structural transformation involve specialization and a shift of a part
of the labor force out of the agricultural sector that create hetero-
geneity in the population, and increase the scope for efficiency-
enhancing land transfers.
Markets for land sale or rental are largely absent in relatively
land-abundant settings where the binding constraint is labor
rather than land, and in subsistence economies where land is
rather equally distributed, the skill-intensity of agricultural culti-
vation is low, and the availability of non-farm opportunities lim-
ited. These processes, together with economic diversification and
growth in the non-farm sector, increase the scope for efficiency-
enhancing land transfers beyond immediate kin and for periods
that are likely to be longer than just one season. The literature doc-
uments that in this case, institutions, especially formal documenta-
tion of ownership to encourage long-term transfers extending
beyond immediate family, can increase land use productivity and
foster economic development and diversification (Badiane et al.,
2012). Land markets will operate more smoothly if clear informa-
tion on land ownership is available at low cost and social norms
ensure that a landlord – who temporarily transfers land through
rental -, does not risk the loss of this asset. This has historically
provided the justification for public registries. Ill-defined or inse-
cure property rights, including a failure of public institutions to
respect and compensate existing rights in case of expropriation
for public purpose, may put productivity-enhancing transactions
out of reach for all or part of the population. Even if rights are clear
and respected, inefficient institutions that make registering trans-
actions costly and cumbersome will reduce the scope for land mar-
ket transactions, e.g. by creating barriers to market participation
(Sitko and Jayne, 2014). This can either undermine the ability to
reap associated gains in terms of productivity and financial market
development or drive such transactions into informality.
Empirical studies support this: Historically, reforms in Russia
increased the scope for land leasing and promoted migration by
easing financial constraints and decreasing opportunity costs
(Chernina et al., 2014). More recently, a randomized roll-out of
land registration in Rwanda helped to significantly improve land
rental market operation and productivity (Ali et al., 2015b), provid-Some African countries are quickly approaching or even surpassing levels of
population density that are normally thought of to be more common in Asia. Rwanda,
with 384 inhabitants/km2 overall and 526/km2 of agricultural land is a prominent
example.
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3 The fact that transactions are outlawed does of course not prevent them from
happening but just drives them underground, depressing productivity and
investment-effects (Deininger et al., 2013b). Well implemented household surveys
are one of the few tools to reliably measure the incidence of such informal
transactions.
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cultural land (Ali et al., 2016). Land certification in Ethiopia had
positive impacts on investment (Holden et al., 2009) and land mar-
ket participation (Deininger et al., 2011a). In India, improving pro-
ducers’ access to information by computerizing land records
helped to increase the number of registered transactions and credit
access in urban but not rural areas (Deininger and Goyal, 2012).
Under Mexico’s 1993–2006 land certification program, households
obtaining certificates were 28% more likely to have a migrant
member but there was no effect on cultivated area due to markets
helping to consolidate farm units (de Janvry et al., 2015). In fact,
clarification of inheritance and providing options for leasing out
is estimated to have increased eligible households’ likelihood of
having one or more members abroad by 12%, explaining 26% of
the 1994–1997 increase in the number of migrants from the entire
ejido sector (Valsecchi, 2014). In China, where sales are not
allowed, issuance of certificates helped reduce the risk of leased
out land being taken back and redistributed (Mullan et al., 2011),
created institutional preconditions for households to take on
non-agricultural activities (Deininger et al., 2014), and increase
efficiency (Deininger and Jin, 2009).
As leasing does not require changes in land ownership, land
owners, even if they give up self-cultivation, will not have to for-
sake benefits from owning land, including the ability to use land
as collateral for loans to start non-agricultural enterprises
(Deininger and Feder, 2001). To the contrary, it provides access
to regular income streams in the form of rents (Deininger, 2003)
which, if competitive markets help transfer land to more produc-
tive producers, will be higher than what owners could obtain from
self-cultivation (Deininger et al., 2011). Households who partici-
pate in off-farm markets will be more likely to supply land to the
rental market (Kung, 2002) and restrictions on land rental may
limit the scope for off-farm development as in Ethiopia
(Deininger et al., 2003a). Equalization of land access through rental
markets is also observed in Kenya (Jin and Jayne, 2013), Uganda
(Baland et al., 2003), Ethiopia (Deininger and Jin, 2006; Teklu and
Lemi, 2004), Eastern Europe (Swinnen and Rozelle, 2009), and India
(Deininger et al., 2008b).
Land sales may allow households who want to move into the
non-agricultural economy to mobilize the equity that will help
them to exploit profitable economic opportunities but they are less
liquid and may be affected by credit and other factor market
imperfections. Indeed, asymmetric information and risk have long
been shown to lead to credit rationing in equilibrium and the use
of collateral as one way of reducing such credit rationing (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981). Its immobility and relative indestructibility
make land an ideal collateral. However, banks will use it for this
purpose on a large scale only if they have access to low-cost means
to make reliable inferences on ownership and the absence of other
encumbrances for any given plot of land. Such information is nor-
mally provided by land registries. Compared to rental, land pur-
chases will require more resources and purchase decisions will
also be affected not only by returns from productive use of land
but also by expected future movements of land prices compared
to those of other assets. Moreover, lack of insurance and highly
covariate risk can cause price fluctuations whereby agricultural
land is cheap in times of crisis (e.g. drought) when farmers have
to resort to distress sales to cover their subsistence and very
expensive in years with good harvests so that land sales markets
may be less equity-enhancing than those for rental and can even
increase inequality (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003).
2.2. Institutional background
The countries in our sample vary not only in terms of relative
factor endowments but also in their institutional framework. OnePlease cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
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was often made without assessment of associated cost or underly-
ing demands, implementation often faces considerable challenges.
Also, in many contexts, implicit or explicit restrictions on rights
may undermine the scope for effective use. Three issues often
encountered are (i) explicit restrictions on land rental markets
including the risk of land loss if land is leased out and thus per-
ceived as not needed or not used effectively; (ii) neglect of existing
rights in case of expropriation by providing compensation only for
improvements or well belowmarket values, often combined with a
wide interpretation of state powers of eminent domain well
beyond the narrow provision of public goods; and (iii) limited doc-
umentation of rights or ability to register them, an issue that would
particularly discourage longer-term transactions.
Ethiopia’s highlands, where land is very scarce, implemented a
participatory, low cost, and gender-balanced effort to provide doc-
umentation of rights to users. This reduced transaction cost and
made land transfers easier, in a context where land sales are not
allowed and, in many regions, leasing of a household’s entire hold-
ing is prohibited to prevent rural-urban migration.3 Also, if land is
converted from rural to urban use, failure to recognize rural holders’
rights is likely to cause tenure insecurity at the urban fringe (Adam,
2014). A similar issue is confronted in Nigeria where a tenure regime
based on state ownership established under the 1978 Land Use Act
severely restricts the scope for having eliminated any private land
ownership and creating far-reaching scope for state interference.
Nigeria is characterized by a regime that creates high levels of tenure
insecurity, undermines investment, and drives transactions under-
ground (Adenyi, 2011). In Niger, land tenure has long been shown
to affect investment (Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996) but enlightened
legislation to facilitate integrated management of natural resources
(Wabnitz, 2009) has little impact due to limited implementation
(Cotula, 2008). Malawi is not only land scarce but also has a dualistic
tenure system where estates, many underutilized or encroached,
exist side by side with customary institutions land. A Land Bill has
been in Parliament for over a decade (Peters and Kambewa, 2007).
Inheritance can follow patriarchal and matriarchal lines. While
women’s land access alone may not increase productivity (Bhaumik
et al., 2013), land inheritance has been identified as a critical determi-
nant of women’s empowerment including their access to divorce
(Telalagic, 2012). In Tanzania, the 1999 Village Land Act vests all rural
land in village councils who are mandated to elaborate participatory
land use plans as pre-condition for issuance of certificates of custom-
ary ownership. Beyond implementation challenges (Pedersen, 2012),
the requirement of having any transfer involving individuals from
outside the village approved at different levels greatly increases the
transaction costs for land transfers and reduces predictability
(Deininger et al., 2011b). In Uganda, overlap of rights between
tenants and landlords on mailo lands that reduces productivity and
investment (Deininger and Ali, 2007) also makes transfers more dif-
ficult. With complex processes and top-heavy structures, the costs of
the country’s 1998 land law were estimated to be prohibitive (Hunt,
2004) and implementation has not yet moved beyond the pilot stage.3. Data and descriptive statistics
Household survey data allow us to explore determinants and
impacts of the operation of land markets, the extent to which such
markets contribute to greater productivity, and barriers to their
functioning. We briefly characterize coverage of surveys availablein Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
4 K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxand use these to describe the nature of the rural economy overall,
estimated levels of participation on both sides of land rental and
sales markets, and characteristics of participants in both types of
transactions.3.1. Data and sample description
We use data from LSMS-ISA surveys in Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger,
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. All of these are based on large, rep-
resentative multi-purpose household surveys with detailed infor-
mation on agricultural production that are representative either
for the entire country or for rural areas within a country. In addi-
tion to having been designed as panels so as to allow controlling
for household-fixed effects, these data have three advantages. First,
they aim to consistently use GPS to measure plot size, to reduce the
measurement error inherent to farmers’ estimates (Kilic et al.,
2013) that can have far-reaching impacts for estimates of outcome
variables such as yield (Carletto et al., 2013). Second, while
phrasing of questions differs somewhat across surveys, they allow
retrieval of information on the gender of the plot manager or
owner.4 This allows to appreciation dimensions of asset ownership
or control by gender and potential implications for efficiency of
resource use (Aguilar et al., 2014). Finally, all surveys provide GPS
coordinates of at least the homestead so as to be able to link to
infrastructure access and other physio-geographic data including
agro-ecological potential (Fischer et al., 2002) that may have an
important impact on production, prices for input and output, and
the ease with which non-farm opportunities can be accessed.
A limitation of our data is that samples are household-rather
than area-based and in some cases limited to rural areas. Land held
by legal entities or corporations, or in cases of rural samples by
urban dwellers, will thus not be captured. This may affect esti-
mates of the farm size distribution in relatively land-abundant
countries where these groups can account for sizeable land hold-
ings. In Zambia for example farms operating between 5 and
100 ha of land, most owned by urban dwellers or companies, have
been found to control more land than the country’s entire small-
holder sector (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). The importance of this gap
will vary across countries depending on the legal framework and
the ability to actually implement it, an issue that on which further
research would be very desirable. For Ethiopia, a commercial farm
survey is available which puts the total area held by operational
commercial farms at 1.55 million hectares (Ali et al., 2015b), com-
pared to 9.2 million hectares cultivated by smallholders so that our
data would account for some 85% of the land used for agriculture in
the country.54 In Ethiopia, the relevant information used is the plot holder’s ID, in Malawi it is the
response (one person) to the question ‘‘who in the household makes the decisions
concerning crops to be planted, input use and the timing of cropping activities on this
plot” for one person in Malawi, in Niger it is the response to the question ‘‘what is the
ID number of the person who currently works the parcel” for one person, and we
identify the manager is joint if the whole household was reported rather than a
personal ID, in Nigeria there are two questions on ‘‘who in the household manages this
plot” (one person) and ‘‘write the ID codes of other household members who are
decision makers on this plot” (up to four persons), and in Tanzania and Uganda, the
manager is identified by the question of ‘‘who decided what to plant on this plot” (one
person) or ‘‘who usually works on this parcel” (up to two persons), respectively. The
extent to which information on the plot owner is provided is more limited. In different
countries, the relevant person is identified in response to the following questions:
‘‘under whose name(s) is the certificate issued for this parcel” (up to two persons) in
Ethiopia; ‘‘who in this household owns this plot” (up to two persons) in Malawi; ‘‘what
is the ID number of the owner of this parcel” for one personwith ‘the whole household’
as one of the codes in Niger; ‘‘who is the owner of this plot” (one person) in Nigeria;
‘‘who in the household owns this plot” (up to two persons) in Tanzania; and ‘‘who has
the ownership/use rights to this parcel” (up to two persons) in Uganda.
5 In Tanzania, the total area cultivated by smallholders, using the weights from our
survey, amounts to 6.026 million hectares, compared to 9.2 million hectares that are
cultivated according to FAO statistics (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).
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Descriptive statistics for the surveys in our sample provide a
number of insights (Table 1), pointing in particular to a wide distri-
bution of land ownership, large productivity gaps across producers,
low levels of formal documentation of land ownership, low fre-
quency of land sales versus rentals, and sizable variation of land
market activity across countries, partly in response to land scarcity
and possibly also to institutional factors. The surveys reveal
marked differences across countries in the shares of illiterate heads
(from 66% in Ethiopia to 16% in Uganda) and mean household
income (from USD 664 to 1396 in Niger though per capita income
is more equally distributed (from USD 323 in Nigeria to USD 205 in
Malawi). They highlight that smallholders rely on diverse and
dynamic livelihood strategies (Davis et al., 2016): while engaged
mainly in agriculture, the majority of households complement
agricultural income with resources from other areas. In fact, except
for Nigeria where 70% of household income is from crops, the mean
contribution of crops and income from crop production is less than
50%, with agricultural wages (from 1% in Nigeria to 15% in Malawi),
self-employment (from 6% in Malawi to 24% in Niger), and trans-
fers (from 1% in Nigeria to 8% in Malawi) making up the rest.
Migration is also widespread with 17% of households in Uganda
as well as 13% in Malawi and 9% in Tanzania having at least one
member who migrated to their current location of residence in
search of work or land. Conversely, 21% in Niger and 8% in Uganda
have a member who migrated out for economic reasons (search for
land or work).
While countries in our sample differ from each other in terms of
relative land scarcity (Jayne et al., 2010), operated area per adult
household member in smallholder farming is often limited by
technology (Binswanger, 1986) and thus less variable across coun-
tries. Indeed, for all of countries except Niger, operated area per
adult is less than one ha. With 3.02 plots per household, the level
of fragmentation is highest in Ethiopia and lowest in Malawi (1.74
plots per household) with many of those with little or no land
engaging in wage employment.
For all countries except Ethiopia we can compute the value of
output as well as profits per ha.6 Doing so points towards variations
in levels of land and labor productivity. With gross per-hectare
income from crops between USD 267 in Malawi and USD 545 in
Uganda,7 net income per hectare ranges from some USD 164 in
Malawi to USD 289 in Tanzania. Combining this with cultivated area
and labor by family workers allows us to obtain a range of net income
per day of family labor between USD 2.21 for Malawi and USD 1.19
for Uganda. As this figure includes returns to land and other fixed
assets, it provides an upper bound estimate of the reservation wage,
at which the average individual would likely be indifferent between
working in own agriculture and taking on non-agricultural wage
work or engaging in non-agricultural self-employment.
With between 93% (in Malawi) and 62% (in Uganda) of house-
holds having acquired land in this way, inheritance or grant by tra-
ditional authorities or the extended family remains the main way
for accessing land. Levels of formal or informal documentation of
land ownership remain low throughout. Except for Ethiopia where
38% of households indicated to have a formal document that covers
close to 50% of owned area due to the country’s participatory low-
cost land certification program (Deininger et al., 2008a), the share
of households with any type of document is below 20% everywhere6 In Ethiopia, output is estimated using crop-cutting of randomly selected
crops/fields in each EA to be able to obtain statistically reliable estimates of output
for different crops. This makes analysis of productivity at farm or household level
impossible.
7 Income and productivity data are doubtful for Nigeria where there are some data
issues with the level of gross income (Oseni et al., 2014).
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Share of landless 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.05
Share agric. cultivators 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.98
Household size 5.15 4.75 6.82 6.02 5.69 6.04
Adults (14–60) 2.57 2.36 3.06 3.09 2.96 3.18
Children (<14) 1.52 2.15 3.52 2.58 2.35 2.86
Old people (>60) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.35 0.37 0.33
Head’s age 44.58 43.04 44.90 50.60 48.88 47.35
Head female 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.12 0.23 0.30
Head never attended school 0.66 0.23 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.16
Head has primary educ. 0.27 0.57 0.44 0.29 0.61 0.57
Head has more than primary educ. 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.30 0.10 0.22
Value of agricultural assets (USD) 323.61 483.73 340.46 415.95 24.49
Value of animals (USD) 499.70 85.98 489.79 185.67 266.45 369.41
Value of durable goods (USD) 1718.56 4402.32 1301.66 2948.10
Consumption (USD) 465.85 1452.10 2547.66 2529.20 1949.23 1093.05
Has members who migrated in for work/land 0.13 0.09 0.17
Has members who migrated out for work/land 0.21 0.08
Share of rural households 0.94 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.84 0.88
Income and its sources
Gross household income (USD) 663.50 1395.64 1307.00 1159.81 1201.75
Gross income per capita (USD) 205.56 309.27 323.27 299.23 268.77
Share from crops 0.51 0.44 0.70 0.51 0.46
Share from livestock 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.19
Share from age wage 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06
Share from non-age wage 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.10
Share from self-employment 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.17 0.13
Share from transfer 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.06
Details of agricultural production
Gross inc. from crops (USD/ha) 515.57 267.09 2233.80 509.88 545.39
Net inc. from crops (USD/ha) 164.11 226.13 1196.67 289.16 279.06
Gross inc. from crops (USD) 266.48 517.01 543.06 434.02 406.27
Gross inc. per capita from crops (USD) 84.79 117.51 142.57 116.90 92.78
# of days by family members 126.82 74.28 151.07 108.76 183.03 234.95
Imputed return to family labor/day 2.21 1.50 11.00 1.58 1.19
Value of hired labor (USD) 20.47 3.56 41.93 27.05 17.79 30.35
Value of fertilizer (USD) 71.85 45.61 53.90 21.85 8.57
Land ownership
No. of plots owned 3.02 1.74 2.74 1.75 2.22 1.88
Has any type of document 0.38 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.19
Area share with any document 0.48 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.17
Area share with formal document 0.48 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.12
Owned area ha 1.05 0.68 5.17 0.73 2.50 1.44
o/w granted by leaders/ext. family 0.48 0.15 0.00 0.78 0.00
o/w inherited 0.40 0.78 0.70 0.00 0.62
o/w purchased 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.26
o/w acquired by other means 0.13 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.13
Operated area ha 1.16 0.72 5.17 0.79 2.12 1.40
Owned area/adult (14–60) 0.44 0.32 1.93 0.28 0.90 0.53
Operated area/adult (14–60) 0.49 0.33 1.92 0.30 0.78 0.51
Male manager 0.80 0.71 0.53 0.81 0.27 0.09
Joint manager 0.36 0.01 0.45 0.52
Female manager 0.19 0.29 0.10 0.18 0.24 0.38
Male owner 0.44 0.35 0.58 0.75 0.40 0.25
Joint owner 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.46
Female owner 0.18 0.45 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.28
Geographic variables
Population density (persons/sq. km) 142.32 175.28 49.07 207.37 64.99 268.53
Distance to nearest major road (km) 17.38 9.46 12.92 17.20 22.09 8.06
Light intensity 20.64 126.83 102.56 210.33 123.38 65.58
Urban gravity 7.04 137.15 41.36 116.35 60.40 53.22
No. of households 3099 10,123 2263 3029 2625 2129
K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5else with the share of area with formal document (certificate of
title or customary ownership) reaching 12% in Uganda, mostly
mailo titles that were issued by the colonial administration.8 It sug-8 We do not include presence of land documents in our regressions because
comparison of answers for the same households across different survey rounds in
Uganda suggests that, without proper training of enumerators, responses may contain
significant measurement error (Ali et al., 2015a).
Please cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.012gests that, although legislation to issue documents to customary
land exists in many countries and households’ demand for formal
documentation in countries such as Tanzania is high (Ali, 2016),
implementation gaps may prevent these from having their full
impact.
Plot managers’ gender varies markedly across countries; male
managers are in charge of some 80% of area in Ethiopia and Nigeria,
71% in Malawi, and 53% in Niger but only 27% and 9% in Tanzaniain Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
Table 2
Details on land market participation at household level. Source: Own computation from LSMS-ISA household surveys.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Autarkic (%) 73.99 89.65 91.12 89.04 92.69 80.55
Rent in (%) 20.81 10.06 7.29 10.80 6.17 18.65
If yes, mean area rented in 0.63 0.49 1.87 0.71 0.82 0.52
If yes, area rented in of operated area (%) 74.69 48.14 87.54 72.64 57.11
Rent out (%) 5.20 0.30 1.59 0.17 1.14 0.80
Total area rented in (with weights) 1,516,979 130,155 262,079 1,069,316 400,091 492,903
Total area rented out (with weights) 206,339 5092 80,486 15,404 197,619 27,824
Total area rented out/Total area rented in (%) 13.60 3.91 30.71 1.44 49.39 5.64
Gini of owned area 0.50 0.40 0.45 0.53 0.59 0.49
Gini of operated area 0.50 0.39 0.45 0.53 0.59 0.48
Purchased any during last 5 years (%) 3.58 9.63
If yes, mean area purchased 2.13 0.57
If yes, area purchased of owned area (%) 53.44 56.68
6 K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxand Uganda where some 45% and 52%, respectively, are under joint
management and 24% of 38% managed by females on their own.
While only 7% or 30% of households report the owner’s gender in
Nigeria and Ethiopia, almost all do so in Uganda and some 80% in
rest of the countries. Female ownership is most widespread in
Malawi with 45%, followed by Uganda (28%), Tanzania (22%), and
Ethiopia (18%).
Summarizing geo-spatial variables highlight differences of pop-
ulation density between the enumeration areas (EAs) selected in
the survey ranging from less than 100 persons/km2 in Niger (49)
and Tanzania (65), 100–200 in Ethiopia (142) and Malawi (175)
and more than 200 in Nigeria (207) and Uganda (268). Comparing
these to the distance to the next road (from 8 and 9 km in Uganda
and Malawi to 17 and 22 km in Nigeria and Tanzania) shows that
access to infrastructure is only weakly correlated with population
density and a similar conclusion emerges with respect to light
intensity and urban gravity.
Information on land rental and land sales in Table 2 illustrates
that, with 21% and 19%, respectively, the share of households rent-
ing in land is highest in Ethiopia and Uganda and, with 6% or 7%,
lowest in Tanzania and Niger. Malawi and Nigeria are in between
with a market participation of 10% or 11%. By comparison, the
share of households who, in the survey, report to rent out land is
much lower, being highest in Ethiopia with 5%, followed by Niger
(1.6%), Tanzania (1.1%), and less than 1% in Uganda, Malawi, and
Nigeria. To explore if, as theoretically possible, this discrepancy
may be due to landlords leasing out large tracts of land to multiple
tenants, we also present the total area which, according to the sur-
vey has been leased in or out using survey weights (which refer to
population). Part of the under-estimation of leased out land may be
due to the fact that, at least in some countries, landlords may move
to urban areas and thus either not be included in the sample or not
respond to questions on leasing out land that may be included in
the agricultural section of the survey (Deininger and Jin, 2008).9
Yet, differences in the share of leased in area not accounted for on
the other side are pronounced; while in Tanzania and Niger about
50% and 30% of the area leased in is also reported to have been leased
out by a landlord, this figure is only 14% for Ethiopia and 6%, 4%, and
1%, respectively for Uganda, Malawi, and Nigeria.10 While the sur-
veys allow inferences on determinants of renting out, getting a fuller
picture of land market functioning will require information on both
sides of land markets.119 As this is an issue that will become of increasing relevance over time, finding
ways to address it in household surveys will very relevant.
10 For the analysis of land rental markets to be conducted here, this implies that use
of a maximum likelihood friction model that accounts for both sides of the market
(Deininger et al., 2008c, 2012) will be infeasible.
11 Obtaining landlord details from households leasing in as for example in Ethiopia
(Deininger et al., 2013a), would be one way of addressing both concerns.
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information on land purchases is available for Uganda and Niger
where 10% and 4% of households, respectively, indicated that they
bought land during the past 5 years. While high levels of land ren-
tal as well as sales market activity in Uganda have long been noted
(Baland et al., 2007), though sales market activity is still below
what is observed in Rwanda (Ali et al.), detailed analysis is possible
only for Uganda and Niger. Plots of the density of owned or oper-
ated land point towards a skewed distribution virtually every-
where, with a vast number of very small plots but a long tail of
some larger ones. To illustrate distributional aspects, Table 3 tabu-
lates mean owned and operated area by quartile of the land own-
ership distribution. Mean owned areas for the top quartile of
1.48 ha in Malawi, 1.88 ha in Nigeria, 2.53 ha in Ethiopia, 3.54 ha
in Uganda, 6.97 ha in Tanzania, and 11.6 ha in Niger highlight dif-
ferences in relative land scarcity. Also, the redistributive effect of
land rental is evident from the fact that in many countries operated
area by the bottom quartile is double what is owned whereas
everywhere the area operated by the largest land owners is less
or equal what they own.3.3. Land rental market participation
A key driver of the operation of land markets are differences in
land ownership and productivity. Data on these variables can thus
help assess the potential for land market operation. Marked differ-
ences between the bottom and top quartiles in both for most coun-
tries in our sample as illustrated in Table 3 points towards
considerable scope for equalizing factor endowments and produc-
tivity through market operation. While differences between the
top and the bottom quartile average 20 for land ownership (panel
A) and even more for productivity (panel B) possibly due to out-
liers, inter-quartile ranges are from 1.64 for Malawi to 2.96 for
Nigeria in terms of land ownership and 2.26 to 3.44 for these coun-
tries in terms of productivity. Also mean monetary output per ha is
higher for smaller farms (panel C). Comparing to the operational
distribution of land in panel D suggests that markets contribute
to narrowing these gaps -the top to bottom quartile ratio narrows
to about 10. Still, with the mean inter-quartile range remaining
above 2, in all of the countries concerned, land markets fall short
of achieving their potential in terms of factor equalization and
are more effective to cut the extremes of the distribution.
To descriptively explore determinants of land market perfor-
mance, Table 4 displays statistics separately for households who
did and did not participate in land rental markets.12 With a large12 As the above discussion points towards considerable measurement error in the
‘leasing out’ variable, we group those who remain in autarky and rent out to compare
with those who rent in.
in Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics by quartile of land ownership and productivity distribution. Source: Own computation from LSMS-ISA household surveys.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Panel A: Land ownership distribution (ha)
Owned area
Mean 1.05 0.68 5.17 0.73 2.50 1.44
Median 0.74 0.53 3.86 0.44 1.25 0.95
Bottom quartile 0.12 0.15 0.93 0.03 0.28 0.20
2nd quartile 0.51 0.42 2.81 0.25 0.87 0.68
3rd quartile 1.05 0.69 5.35 0.74 1.88 1.36
Top quartile 2.53 1.48 11.60 1.88 6.97 3.54
Top quartile/bottom quartile 21.08 9.87 12.47 62.67 24.89 17.70
3rd quartile/2nd quartile 2.06 1.64 1.90 2.96 2.16 2.00
Skewness 2.67 3.68 1.88 1.91 5.69 2.67
Owned area/adult (14–60)
Mean 0.44 0.32 1.93 0.28 0.90 0.53
Median 0.31 0.24 1.41 0.16 0.49 0.34
Bottom quartile 0.06 0.08 0.42 0.02 0.13 0.09
2nd quartile 0.25 0.22 1.20 0.11 0.38 0.30
3rd quartile 0.46 0.34 2.19 0.30 0.78 0.55
Top quartile 0.97 0.62 3.88 0.67 2.28 1.18
Top quartile/bottom quartile 16.17 7.75 9.24 33.50 17.54 13.11
3rd quartile/2nd quartile 1.84 1.55 1.83 2.73 2.05 1.83
Skewness 3.55 3.68 2.50 2.44 6.30 6.52
Panel B: Productivity distribution (USD)
Mean 164.11 226.13 1196.67 289.16 279.06
Median 96.25 73.68 316.42 121.92 147.24
Bottom quartile 3.13 5.60 7.37 18.40 14.55
2nd quartile 58.78 47.67 172.63 81.14 91.84
3rd quartile 150.51 107.98 594.63 185.72 229.16
3rd quartile/2nd quartile 0.39 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.40
Top quartile 444.01 744.19 4012.04 871.98 781.67
Panel C: Productivity distribution (USD) by cultivated area
Bottom quartile 244.68 625.88 2947.21 781.98 596.59
2nd quartile 159.80 137.62 1099.28 239.43 276.37
3rd quartile 145.11 99.03 500.72 171.10 178.28
Top quartile 106.60 52.99 267.21 87.17 86.33
Top quartile/bottom quartile 0.44 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.14
3rd quartile/2nd quartile 0.91 0.72 0.46 0.71 0.65
Skewness 7.74 24.06 13.19 29.61 8.77
Panel D: Operational land distribution (ha)
Operated area
Mean 1.16 0.72 5.17 0.79 2.12 1.40
Median 0.83 0.57 3.90 0.52 1.02 0.94
Bottom quartile 0.24 0.29 1.12 0.29 0.35 0.44
2nd quartile 0.63 0.44 2.91 0.26 0.77 0.70
3rd quartile 1.14 0.71 5.32 0.75 1.62 1.28
Top quartile 2.62 1.45 11.34 1.88 5.74 3.19
Top quartile/bottom quartile 10.92 5.00 10.13 6.48 16.40 7.25
3rd quartile/2nd quartile 1.81 1.61 1.83 2.88 2.10 1.83
Skewness 2.41 3.77 1.86 1.87 6.18 2.27
Operated area/adult (14–60)
Mean 0.49 0.33 1.92 0.30 0.78 0.51
Median 0.34 0.25 1.45 0.18 0.40 0.35
Bottom quartile 0.13 0.14 0.50 0.13 0.17 0.19
2nd quartile 0.31 0.23 1.24 0.11 0.34 0.30
3rd quartile 0.50 0.34 2.17 0.30 0.68 0.51
Top quartile 0.99 0.61 3.75 0.67 1.89 1.05
Top quartile/bottom quartile 7.62 4.36 7.50 5.15 11.12 5.53
3rd quartile/2nd quartile 1.61 1.48 1.75 2.73 2.00 1.70
Skewness 3.20 3.72 2.50 2.68 5.98 4.38
K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 7part of those renting in land being landless (74% in Nigeria, 54% in
Malawi, 35% in Tanzania, and 25 and 24% in Niger and Uganda,
respectively), land rental allows the land poor to access land. In
Ethiopia and Malawi, lessees have more labor than non lessees and
have higher levels of human capital. While this suggests that, beyond
improving equity, land rental could also allow more productive land
use. Lessees’ yields are, however, significantly higher than those of
non-lessees’ only in Uganda.Please cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.012Younger household heads are more likely to rent in land to
expand the size of their agricultural holding although with an aver-
age head age of beyond 40 -from 40 in Malawi to 49 in Nigeria-
intergenerational mobility and youth access to land may still be
an issue that warrants attention. While the share of those without
any education is lower among those renting in than the rest
everywhere, possibly pointing towards a minimum level of func-
tional literacy, participation in rental markets does not seem toin Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics by nature of land rental markets participation.
Rent in Rent in Rent in
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ethiopia Malawi Niger
Basic household characteristics
Share of landless 0.00 0.09 *** 0.00 0.54 *** 0.00 0.25 ***
Share agric. Cultivators 0.99 1.00 ** 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
Household size 5.11 5.30 ** 4.70 5.22 *** 6.76 7.55 ***
Adults (14–60) 2.54 2.69 ** 2.31 2.79 *** 3.05 3.28 *
Kids (<14) 1.50 1.59 2.14 2.31 *** 3.48 4.04 ***
Old people (>60) 0.26 0.15 *** 0.25 0.12 *** 0.24 0.23
Female head 0.24 0.10 *** 0.26 0.15 *** 0.08 0.04 **
Age of head 45.62 40.68 *** 43.41 39.70 *** 45.09 42.39 **
Head never attended school 0.68 0.61 *** 0.24 0.16 *** 0.51 0.46
Head has primary 0.26 0.32 *** 0.58 0.49 *** 0.44 0.47
Head has more than primary 0.04 0.06 ** 0.18 0.35 *** 0.05 0.07
Consumption (USD) 490.01 369.62 *** 1373.12 2158.5 *** 2538.08 2669.5
Has members who migrated in 0.12 0.30 ***
Has members who migrated out 0.20 0.32 ***
Share of rural household 0.95 0.91 *** 0.93 0.79 *** 0.86 0.82
Income and its sources
Household gross income (USD) 614.03 1106.0 *** 1381.78 1571.8 *
Share from crops 0.52 0.42 *** 0.43 0.45
Share from livestock 0.10 0.09 *** 0.17 0.16
Share from age wage 0.16 0.12 *** 0.02 0.02
Share from non-age wage 0.08 0.22 *** 0.06 0.05
Share from self employment 0.06 0.11 *** 0.24 0.26
Share from transfer 0.08 0.04 *** 0.07 0.05 **
Gross income per capita (USD) 194.98 300.23 306.60 343.17
Gross inc. from crops (USD/ha) 519.77 478.00 268.86 244.78
Net inc. from crops (USD/ha) 168.63 123.71 *** 229.33 185.78
Land endowments
Owned area/adult (14–60) 0.45 0.40 ** 0.34 0.11 *** 2.00 1.06 ***
No. of plots owned 2.98 3.18 * 1.85 0.71 *** 2.78 2.25 ***
Owned area ha 1.06 1.02 0.73 0.26 *** 5.32 3.28 ***
Operated area ha 1.03 1.63 *** 0.72 0.75 5.17 5.13
Operated area/adult (14–60) 0.44 0.66 *** 0.34 0.31 ** 1.94 1.72
Has any type of document 0.36 0.48 0.01 0.03 *** 0.11 0.13
Male manager 0.77 0.90 0.70 0.79 *** 0.53 0.58
Joint manager 0.36 0.32
Female manager 0.22 0.09 0.30 0.21 *** 0.10 0.08
Male owner 0.48 0.31 0.36 0.23 *** 0.59 0.42 ***
Joint owner 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.13 * 0.26 0.15 ***
Female owner 0.22 0.08 0.47 0.20 *** 0.09 0.07
Production
Gross inc. from crops (USD) 265.87 272.09 511.91 581.14
Gross inc. per capita from crops (USD) 85.66 76.96 116.41 131.33
# of days by family members 113.73 175.32 *** 74.79 69.73 ** 149.63 169.30
Value of hired labor (USD) 20.23 21.36 3.21 6.70 *** 41.55 46.67
Value of fertilizer (USD) 69.52 93.00 *** 42.92 79.45 *
Assets
Value of agricultural assets (USD) 322.89 330.03 479.98 531.51 **
Value of animals (USD) 510.00 460.54 * 86.90 77.77 * 490.27 483.62
Value of durable goods (USD) 1604.3 2740.8 *** 4344.84 5133.3 **
Geo variables
Share of non-age wage inc. (EA level) 0.09 0.16 *** 0.06 0.07 *
Population density (persons/sq. km) 147.42 123.79 174.87 179.21 47.99 61.90
Distance to the nearest major road (km) 17.35 17.52 9.72 7.15 *** 13.25 8.67 ***
Light intensity 22.17 14.83 110.02 277.15 *** 101.99 109.80
Urban gravity 5.29 13.69 132.28 180.71 *** 41.78 36.00
No. of households 2454 645 9105 1018 2098 165
Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Basic household characteristics
Share of landless 0.00 0.74 *** 0.00 0.35 *** 0.00 0.24 ***
Share agric. Cultivators 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.99 *** 0.98 1.00 ***
Household size 6.02 6.09 5.68 5.75 6.08 5.82
Adults (14–60) 3.09 3.10 2.96 3.00 3.21 3.03 *
Kids (<14) 2.57 2.71 2.34 2.59 2.87 2.80
Old people (>60) 0.36 0.27 ** 0.39 0.15 *** 0.36 0.21 ***
Female head 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.31
Age of head 50.79 49.11 * 49.25 43.20 *** 48.04 44.33 ***
Head never attended school 0.41 0.36 * 0.29 0.21 ** 0.17 0.12 ***
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Head has primary 0.29 0.30 0.60 0.69 ** 0.57 0.60
Head has more than primary 0.29 0.33 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.22
Consumption (USD) 2500.43 2762.80 ** 1948.62 1958.5 1087.21 1119.0
Has members who migrated in 0.09 0.14 * 0.16 0.22 ***
Has members who migrated out 0.08 0.10
Share of rural household 0.88 0.80 *** 0.85 0.78 *** 0.89 0.83 ***
Income and its sources
Mean household gross income (USD) 1301.77 1350.2 1149.79 1312.1 1147.17 1439.9 ***
Share from crops 0.70 0.69 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.48 *
Share from livestock 0.10 0.07 ** 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.14 ***
Share from age wage 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07
Share from non-age wage 0.08 0.11 ** 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.14 ***
Share from self employment 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.25 *** 0.14 0.12
Share from transfer 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 ** 0.06 0.06
Gross income per capita (USD) 320.85 343.32 297.47 326.02 250.20 349.81
Gross inc. from crops (USD/ha) 2286.8 1796.6 * 494.09 735.14 * 503.20 725.39 ***
Net inc. from crops (USD/ha) 1204.2 1134.20 284.43 356.55 256.67 374.62 ***
Land endowments
Owned area/adult (14–60) 0.30 0.05 *** 0.94 0.35 *** 0.61 0.20 ***
No. of plots owned 1.90 0.49 *** 2.28 1.27 *** 2.04 1.15 ***
Owned area ha 0.79 0.19 *** 2.60 0.98 *** 1.64 0.57 ***
Operated area ha 0.78 0.89 ** 2.15 1.59 * 1.48 1.07 ***
Operated area/adult (14–60) 0.30 0.34 ** 0.79 0.59 * 0.54 0.38 ***
Has any type of document 0.15 0.09 ** 0.17 0.26 ***
Share of plots with gender of manager 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96
Male manager 0.82 0.73 *** 0.27 0.32 0.09 0.10
Joint manager 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.42 0.54 0.45 ***
Female manager 0.17 0.26 *** 0.24 0.21 0.37 0.44 ***
Share of plots with gender of owner 0.07 0.05 0.85 0.31 0.98 0.98
Male owner 0.77 0.62 * 0.40 0.27 *** 0.26 0.20 ***
Joint owner 0.32 0.15 *** 0.46 0.47
Female owner 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.12 ** 0.28 0.32 *
Production
Gross inc. from crops (USD) 542.02 552.21 428.99 506.18 ** 387.61 485.66 ***
Gross inc. per capita from crops (USD) 142.64 141.97 116.33 125.07 87.98 113.23
# of days by family members 106.76 125.31 185.16 152.63 ** 232.96 243.43
Value of days by hired labor (USD) 26.94 28.03 17.25 25.45 * 32.53 21.10 ***
Value of used fertilizer (USD) 56.44 31.73 ** 21.24 30.58 8.10 10.59
Assets
Value of agricultural assets (USD) 145.45 1951.8 *** 409.93 507.48 26.40 16.14
Value of animals (USD) 194.94 109.10 *** 268.50 235.34 403.90 218.93
Value of durable goods (USD) 1295.6 1351.9 2839.35 3422.6
Geo variables
Share of non-age wage income (EA level) 0.08 0.10 ** 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 ***
Population density (persons/sq. km) 212.44 166.46 65.06 63.98 266.06 279.40
Distance to the nearest major road (km) 17.30 16.36 22.33 18.35 ** 8.20 7.41 *
Light intensity 200.44 292.02 *** 123.47 122.07 52.63 122.38 ***
Urban gravity 110.34 165.98 *** 61.56 42.73 38.60 117.32 ***
No. of households 2702 327 2463 162 1732 397
Note: Tests for differences of means between lessees and non lessees are reported with
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Malawi where educated wealthy households seem to access land
through rental markets. Households headed by females are less
likely to rent in land in Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger, something that
may partly be a result of their lower overall labor endowment. To
the extent that information on the value of assets is available, we
note that lessees in Niger and Nigeria but not in Uganda hold more
agricultural assets. Interestingly, land is transferred to wealthier
households ($2741 vs. $1604 value of durable goods but not agri-
cultural assets) in Malawi. In Malawi and Uganda and to a lesser
degree in Tanzania, households with in-migrants are more likely
to lease in land while in Niger those with out-migrants are more
likely to rent in.
Non-farm diversification seems a key driver of land rental activ-
ity. In Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda, land markets are more activePlease cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.012in the enumeration areas with greater non-agricultural employ-
ment although levels of land market activity do not seem to vary
with local population. Information on tenants’/landlords’ non-
agricultural incomes would allow to ascertain if/how land markets
contribute to structural transformation by either allowing inter-
ested individuals to take up non-agricultural employment without
losing the safety net function implied by land ownership and mak-
ing effective use of their land (Deininger et al., 2011c) or by allevi-
ating credit constraints.
3.4. Land sales market participation
Data on land sales are available only for two countries -Uganda
and Niger. While including questions on land acquisition in sam-
ples of agricultural cultivators is important, land may increasinglyin Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics by land sale market participation.
Niger Uganda
Autarky or sold Purchased Autarky or sold Purchased
Basic household characteristics
Share of landless 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 ***
Share agric. Cultivators 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 **
Household size 6.79 7.80 *** 6.00 6.39 *
Adults (14–60) 3.05 3.41 * 3.19 3.04
Kids (<14) 3.49 4.25 *** 2.81 3.35 ***
Old people (>60) 0.24 0.15 * 0.35 0.13 ***
Female head 0.08 0.02 * 0.31 0.19 ***
Age of head 44.98 42.65 48.04 40.86 ***
Head never attended school 0.51 0.38 ** 0.17 0.11 **
Head has primary 0.44 0.54 * 0.58 0.52 *
Head has more than primary 0.05 0.07 0.21 0.29 ***
Consumption (USD) 2504.52 3709.88 *** 1067.99 1332.51 ***
Has members who migrated in 0.16 0.28 ***
Has members who migrated out 0.20 0.27 0.08 0.10
Share of rural household 0.86 0.79 * 0.88 0.88
Income and its sources
Mean household gross income (USD) 1381.66 1772.24 *** 1155.10 1639.64 ***
Share from crops 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.44
Share from livestock 0.17 0.21 * 0.19 0.17
Share from age wage 0.02 0.00 ** 0.06 0.06
Share from non-age wage 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.14 **
Share from self employment 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.17 **
Share from transfer 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 ***
Gross income per capita (USD) 308.60 327.16 255.84 390.18
Gross inc. from crops (USD/ha) 269.25 209.32 528.80 697.97 *
Net inc. from crops (USD/ha) 230.11 119.68 268.19 379.12 ***
Land endowments
Owned area/adult (14–60) five years ago 1.94 1.09 *** 0.65 0.30 ***
Owned area/adult (14–60) 1.93 1.96 0.54 0.47
No. of plots owned five years ago 2.20 1.68 ** 1.69 1.26 ***
No. of plots owned 2.70 3.75 *** 1.80 2.58 ***
Owned area ha five years ago 4.43 2.72 *** 1.38 0.70 ***
Owned area ha 5.15 5.62 1.46 1.31
Operated area ha 5.16 5.33 1.41 1.35
Operated area/adult (14–60) 1.93 1.81 0.51 0.49
Has any type of document 0.09 0.46 *** 0.16 0.43 ***
Share of plots with gender of manager 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97
Male manager 0.53 0.68 *** 0.10 0.06
Joint manager 0.36 0.24 ** 0.51 0.58 *
Female manager 0.10 0.08 0.39 0.35
Share of plots with gender of owner 0.78 0.90 0.98 0.99
Male owner 0.58 0.73 *** 0.25 0.31 **
Joint owner 0.26 0.11 *** 0.45 0.52 **
Female owner 0.09 0.07 0.30 0.16 ***
Production
Gross inc. from crops (USD) 513.49 611.57 394.94 510.19 ***
Gross inc. per capita from crops (USD) 117.60 115.12 89.96 118.71
# of days by family members 148.73 213.67 *** 233.37 249.44
Value of days by hired labor (USD) 39.17 116.05 *** 28.65 45.97 ***
Value of used fertilizer (USD) 44.90 64.66 6.89 24.03 ***
Assets
Value of agricultural assets (USD) 481.79 536.08 * 24.64 23.03
Value of animals (USD) 482.48 686.53 ** 366.97 392.27
Value of durable goods (USD) 4348.33 5856.95 *** 2607.45 6145.21
Geo variables
Share of non-age wage income (EA level) 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10
Population density (persons/sq. km) 48.43 65.09 265.21 300.51
Distance to the nearest major road (km) 12.92 12.90 8.08 7.87
Light intensity 101.14 140.93 61.11 107.71 *
Urban gravity 41.58 35.30 52.07 64.05
No. of households 2182 81 1924 205
Note: Tests of differences of means between lessees and non lessees are reported with
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
10 K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxalso be acquired by firms that may not be visible in household sur-
veys (Headey and Jayne, 2014; Schoneveld, 2014). Analysis of such
transactions can be of great policy relevance (Sitko and Jayne,Please cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.0122014) and will be important especially in land-abundant countries
where, in the context of the post-2008 food price spike (Deininger
and Byerlee, 2011), magnitudes involved are likely to be large andin Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
Table 6
Determinants of land rental market participation.
Ethiopia Malawi Niger Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Rent in Rent in Rent in Rent in Rent in Rent in
Owned area (ha) 0.038*** 0.142*** 0.010*** 0.117*** 0.019*** 0.108***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.002) (0.030) (0.003) (0.014)
# of <14 years old 0.031*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.011** 0.004* 0.003
(0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
# of 14–60 years old 0.025** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.004 0.014**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
# of >60 years old 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.004 0.024** 0.034*
(0.031) (0.006) (0.013) (0.023) (0.010) (0.017)
Age of head/10 0.034*** 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.012) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Illiterate head 0.020 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.040
(0.066) (0.006) (0.023) (0.031) (0.014) (0.026)
Head has primary 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.009
(0.064) (0.005) (0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.021)
Female head 0.157*** 0.011*** 0.036** 0.039* 0.001 0.009
(0.028) (0.004) (0.016) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016)
Mbr migrated in 0.029*** 0.019 0.045*
(0.008) (0.016) (0.024)
Mbr migrated out 0.032* 0.000
(0.017) (0.029)
Durable good val./1000 0.010*** 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
HH cons./1000 0.126*** 0.005** 0.010* 0.004 0.001 0.000
(0.043) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Rural pop. Dens (1000/km2) 0.555*** 0.071*** 0.339*** 0.223** 0.047 0.047
(0.168) (0.026) (0.115) (0.088) (0.055) (0.056)
Share non age wage inc. (EA) 0.573 0.022 0.097 0.033 0.038 0.063
(1.059) (0.019) (0.086) (0.074) (0.043) (0.088)
Dist. to the nearest road 0.460 0.484** 0.279 0.370 0.112 1.207
(1.390) (0.223) (0.605) (0.749) (0.190) (1.648)
Rural dummy 0.013* 0.027 0.041 0.012 0.014
(0.007) (0.017) (0.047) (0.015) (0.030)
Observations 1514 9166 1946 988 1866 1961
Pseudo R-squared 0.093 0.256 0.085 0.165 0.106 0.156
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by EA in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 11thus will affect the agricultural sector more broadly (Jayne et al.,
2014). Use of data on land transfers from registries as a frame is
one option to cross-check and complement data from household
samples that would also allow obtaining ‘objective’ land prices.13
Descriptive statistics for households who did or did not pur-
chase land over the last 5 years in Table 5 for Uganda and Niger
suggest that in Uganda households with in-migrants are more
likely to have purchased land than remained in autarky or sold.
Sales markets had a mildly redistributive effect and transferred
land to those with lower land endowments.14 At the same time,
those who purchased land expanded existing holdings, are better
educated, have significantly higher income and assets, and apply
slightly more inputs than those in autarky. Infrastructure access
seems to matter less for land purchases than for rentals, something
that could be due to a number of reasons (e.g. buyers having access
to transport).13 In many countries, a desire to avoid taxes, together with an outdated valuation
system, implies that prices for registered sales may be systematically under-declared,
something that is often associated with weak governance.
14 Figures for land ownership are 2.72 ha vs. 4.43 ha for owned area, and 1.09 ha vs.
1.94 ha for owner area per adult in Niger and 0.70 ha vs. 1.38 ha for owned area, and
0.30 ha vs. 0.65 ha for owned area per adult in Uganda.
Please cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.0124. Econometric exploration of determinants of land rental and
sales participation
As, for most countries, information on leasing out in our data is
too thin for meaningful estimates,15 we assess determinants of land
rental market participation by estimating a probit equation of the
form:
Rij ¼ aþ bXij þ cZj þ eij ð1Þ
where i and j index households and enumeration areas, respec-
tively, Rij is an indicator variable for households renting in land,
Xij is a vector of household characteristics, Zj is a vector of
location-specific variables,16 and b and c are vectors of parameters.
Results, reported in Table 6 for specifications with geo-variables
(density, distance to road, non-agricultural income shares) allow to15 Ethiopia is the only country where the underlying household survey points to a
share of lessors of more than 5%. As in 62% of cases, information on plot size for plots
rented out is missing we can only run very basic regressions to assess determinants of
market participation on both sides.
16 We run separate regressions with one geographic variable each time due to high
correlations. Regression results on light intensity and urban gravity as well as
separately for North and South Nigeria as suggested by Oseni et al. (2014) are
available on request.
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Table 7
Determinants of land sale markets participation during last five years.
Niger Uganda
Owned area five years ago (ha) 0.003** 0.003** 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
# of < 14 years old five years ago 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
# of 14–60 years old five years
ago
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
# of > 60 years old five years ago 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Age of head/10 0.003 0.003 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Illiterate head 0.014 0.016 0.004 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020)
Head has primary 0.014 0.016 0.030** 0.031**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Female head 0.020** 0.020** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Has members who migrated in 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Has members who migrated out 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Value of durable goods/1000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Household consumption/1000 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)








0.181** 0.156** 0.051 0.048
(0.079) (0.078) (0.034) (0.036)
Share of non age wage income
(EA level)
0.008 0.012 0.017 0.038
(0.044) (0.046) (0.052) (0.053)
Distance to the nearest major
road/1000
0.196 0.187 0.719 0.759
(0.374) (0.369) (0.842) (0.852)
Rural area 0.011 0.011 0.027* 0.022
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 1946 1899 1961 1913
R-squared 0.104 0.111 0.111 0.112
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets.
* Significant at 10%;
** Significant at 5%;
*** Significant at 1%.
17 The survey for Ethiopia only asked for the quantity of assets, a measure that is not
comparable with other countries and, without very strong assumptions on implicit
asset values, is difficult to translate into monetary values. We thus have excluded it.
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statistics. The main conclusion is that, while land rental can play
an important role to equalize land endowments and land/labor
ratios, allow more efficient producers access to access land, and
contribute to movement of labor out of agriculture, the extent to
which it does so varies widely across countries in ways that partly
are linked to institutional factors. Subject to data limitations, anal-
ysis suggests that, while land rental markets fail to fully equalize
factor ratios, they contribute to structural transformation by help-
ing to transfer land to land-poor and relatively labor-rich
households.
A finding that is very consistent across countries is that land
markets contribute to equalization of land endowments. In all
countries, lower land endowments increase the propensity of land
market participation, with estimated effects largest in Malawi,
Nigeria, and Uganda where overall land pressure is high and rather
modest in Tanzania, Niger, and Ethiopia. Evidence of labor market
equalization is more ambiguous with positive signs on the size of
the adult labor force aged 14–60 only in Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger
and Uganda but not in Nigeria and Tanzania. The negative coeffi-Please cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.012cient in the rent-out equation for Ethiopia points towards some
equalization there as well (reported in the appendix table). With
the exception of Ethiopia, head’s age is not significant. At the same
time, regressions point towards females being less likely to rent in
land in many countries, even if differences in other factor endow-
ments are accounted for, with effects most pronounced in Ethiopia
(in line with that of the rent-out equation reported in the appendix
table), followed by Nigeria, Niger and Malawi. Coefficients on
assets are significant only in Malawi and those on yields (reported
in the appendix table) in Malawi and (weakly) in Niger.17
In Malawi, households with members who migrated in are sig-
nificantly more likely to lease in- or marginally significant coeffi-
cients in Uganda. Geo-variables add interesting insights; while
higher population density is associated with higher levels of rental
activity in Malawi and Niger, the relationship is insignificant in
Uganda and Tanzania and negative in Ethiopia and Nigeria. In other
words, and contrary to the potential for transactions to enhance
efficiency, in four of our countries rental activity either does not
increase or is lower in more densely populated areas, possibly
because of higher expropriation risk in these areas. This would
be consistent with the fact that negative coefficients emerge in
the two countries where the literature suggests expropriation risk
in the context of urban expansion is highest, further testing of this
hypothesis would be useful. Similarly, share of non-farm income
remains insignificant throughout and, with the exception of
Malawi, coefficients on distance to the next road are insignificant
as well, pointing to at best a weak link between market access
and growth of rental activities.
Regression results for land sale markets participation in Uganda
and Niger using Eq. (1) but letting Rij be an indicator for land pur-
chase during the last 5 years are reported in Table 7. Interestingly,
in these two countries, the (marginally) more efficient and land-
poor but not asset-poor purchased land and coefficients on geo-
graphic variables remain largely insignificant.5. Conclusion and policy implications
The above analysis suggests that land markets are more active
and have potential to contribute to structural transformation in
Africa than commonly assumed. Analytically, this points towards
a need to replace traditional views on African agriculture with a
more differentiated and empirically grounded view. Consistent
micro-data, together with an understanding of the institutional
context, can help to identify ways in which this potential can be
utilized. In the cases considered here, land market performance
seems to be lower where implicit or explicit restrictions on land
rental exist, where perceived threats of uncompensated expropria-
tion reduce subjective tenure insecurity, and where policies to doc-
ument existing land rights exist but are not implemented or
implemented in an ad hoc manner or in a way that leaves out
specific groups of land holders, in particular women, or is unafford-
able to them. Further study to explore these possible links in more
detail, possibly harnessing within-country variation, would be of
interest.
Methodologically, our analysis points towards a number of
areas where improvements in household questionnaire design
and associated data collection protocols on land could make data
even more useful. Key areas in this respect are (i) a more consistent
recording of the history of land acquisition (to approximate land
purchases); (ii) identifying rights held by individuals, including
identification of plot manager and owner and possibly linking toin Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape? Food Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.
K. Deininger et al. / Food Policy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 13land acquisition or inheritance history; (iii) providing an explana-
tion for the discrepancies between land rented in and rented out
(e.g. by asking questions to trace landlords for rented in or tenants
for rented out parcels); (iv) training enumerators to distinguish dif-
ferent types of formal and informal documents (including maps)
that may have been obtained to document ownership; (v) includ-
ing proxy variables -e.g. likelihood of still owning the plot in
5 years or subjective risk of dispossession with or without
compensation- of tenure insecurity; and (vi) cross-checking actual
or hypothetical land prices to ensure their realism. This should go
hand in hand with efforts to improving capacity for analysis of
such data. Further opportunities to understand structural transfor-
mation in Africa and beyond can be harnessed by linking house-
hold data with remotely sensed imagery and administrative data.
From a policy perspective, our results imply a need to comple-
ment the focus on land administration and certification of rights
with a broader perspective that takes into account restrictions on
land transactions as well as the ways in which the growing
demand for land from non-agricultural uses, especially urbaniza-Table A1
Determinants of land rental market participation.
Ethiopia Malawi
Rent out Rent in
Owned area (ha) 0.141***
(0.007)
# of <14 years old 0.007 0.004***
(0.004) (0.001)
# of 14–60 years old 0.011* 0.011***
(0.006) (0.002)
# of >60 years old 0.016 0.007
(0.012) (0.006)
Age of head/10 0.011** 0.002
(0.005) (0.002)
Illiterate head 0.010 0.007
(0.037) (0.006)
Head has primary 0.013 0.001
(0.042) (0.005)
Female head 0.086*** 0.012***
(0.023) (0.004)
Mbr migrated in 0.024***
(0.008)
Mbr migrated out
Value of durable goods/1000 0.010***
(0.001)
Household consumption/1000 0.037 0.005**
(0.026) (0.002)
Ln output value/ha 0.050***
(0.010)
Ln output value/ha squared 0.006***
(0.001)
Rural pop. density (1000/sq km) 0.048 0.066***
(0.071) (0.024)
Share of non age wage income (EA) 0.020 0.023
(0.368) (0.021)





Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.267
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by EA in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
Please cite this article in press as: Deininger, K., et al. Smallholders’ land access
org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.09.012tion, industry, and infrastructure, and from investors generally, is
dealt with. To the extent that the recommended simple improve-
ments in terms of questionnaire design are implemented, ready
availability of high quality micro-level data of the type analyzed
here will be essential to provide the information to do so.
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Appendix A
See Table A1.Niger Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Rent in Rent in Rent in Rent in
0.010*** 0.129*** 0.022*** 0.108***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.003) (0.015)
0.009*** 0.011** 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
0.010*** 0.000 0.004 0.014**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
0.018 0.003 0.025** 0.036**
(0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (0.018)
0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007)
0.006 0.010 0.001 0.037
(0.023) (0.029) (0.015) (0.027)
0.002 0.020 0.002 0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.021)
0.036** 0.051** 0.002 0.007







0.009* 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
0.026* 0.023 0.013 0.040
(0.014) (0.037) (0.015) (0.030)
0.003** 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
0.299*** 0.215*** 0.031 0.066
(0.116) (0.080) (0.060) (0.058)
0.093 0.003 0.037 0.100
(0.091) (0.074) (0.048) (0.091)
0.247 0.368 0.075 1.175
(0.621) (0.617) (0.202) (1.647)
0.025 0.025 0.011 0.012
(0.018) (0.039) (0.016) (0.031)
1899 903 1698 1913
0.088 0.195 0.114 0.161
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